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Why Are Economics Students More Selfish than the Rest?
* 
 
A substantial body of research suggests that economists are less generous than other 
professionals and that economics students are less generous than other students. We 
address this question using administrative data on donations to social programs by students 
at the University of Washington. Our data set allows us to track student donations and 
economics training over time in order to distinguish selection effects from indoctrination 
effects. We find that economics majors are less likely to donate than other students and that 
there is an indoctrination effect for non-majors but not for majors. Women majors and non-
majors are less likely to contribute than comparable men. 
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I. Introduction 
There is a common belief—supported by the bulk of the relevant academic 
literature—that economists are less generous than other professionals and that economics 
students are less generous than other students. But why are economists more selfish? One 
possibility is selection, i.e., that more selfish individuals choose to become economics 
majors. Another possibility is indoctrination, i.e., that training in economics encourages 
students to emulate the homo economicus found in microeconomics texts.   
  Our contribution to this literature comes from an analysis of voluntary 
contributions to social programs by University of Washington undergraduates, who are 
offered an opportunity to make such contributions when they register each quarter. We 
find that economics majors are less generous than students majoring in a non-economics 
discipline within the College of Arts and Sciences (A&S), and that this lack of generosity is 
due to selection, not indoctrination. But we also find an indoctrination effect for non-
majors: voluntary giving by non-majors—but not by majors—declines significantly after 
exposure to economics instruction Section II provides background on the empirical work 
on differences in the propensity of economists relative to non-economists to give. Section 
III describes the data, Section IV provides a descriptive analysis, and Section V outlines the 
empirical model. Section VI describes and discusses the results. In addition to the findings 
regarding economics training and major discussed above, we find that women, 
international students, and minority students are less likely to contribute than their 
complements.  
   4 
II. Background 
  Inquiry into the question of whether economists are less apt to engage in what Frey 
and Meyer (2004) refer to as pro-social behavior begins with Marwell and Ames (1981), 
who find that economics graduate students are more likely than other groups to free ride in 
a public-goods experiment. Additional experiments produced similar results: economics 
students offer less in ultimatum games (Carter and Irons 1991), they are more likely to 
defect in prisoners’ dilemma games (Frank, Gilovich and Regan 1993), they are more likely 
to defect in a solidarity game (Selten and Ockenfels 1998), and they are more likely to 
accept bribes (Frank and Schulze 2000). 
   Other research relies on survey data. Rubenstein (2009) describes various business 
scenarios and asks students, as hypothetical employers, to make a series of decisions with 
respect to their employees; he finds that economics students are more likely to place profit 
maximization ahead of the welfare of the workers. Economists among Frey and 
Pommerehne’s (1993) and Haucap and Just’s (2003) survey respondents are more apt to 
view allocation based on prices as a fair mechanism for allocation.  
  Two studies come to the opposite conclusion, finding that economists are more 
likely to engage in pro-social behavior than others. First, Laband and Beil (1999) study 
dues payments to professional associations and find that “professional economists are 
significantly more honest/cooperative than professional political scientists, and especially, 
professional sociologists.” Second, Yezer et al. (1996) conduct a “lost-letter” experiment by 
leaving envelopes containing cash in classrooms and find that students in upper-level 
economics classes are more likely than students in other upper-level classes to return the 
envelopes. The Laband and Beil result could, however, stem from income differences   5 
between professions, or from differences in membership benefits. The Yezer et al. study the 
sample sizes are small (N=64) and the differences are only marginally significant.  
  With one exception, previous studies such as the ones above use data from 
classroom experiments, surveys, or other fairly artificial environments. The exception—
Frey and Meier (2003), in a real-world situation similar to ours—uses administrative data 
on student contributions to social funds at the University of Zurich (UZ). (See also Frey and 
Meier 2004 and Benz and Meier 2008.) Students at UZ are asked at registration each 
semester if they want to contribute the equivalent of $4.20 to a “loan fund” that provides 
loans to needy students, and also if they want to contribute the equivalent of $3 to a 
“foreigner fund” that assists foreign students. Frey and Meier compare students of political 
economy (known to Americans as “economics”) with students of business economics 
(known to Americans as “business administration”) and students from other disciplines; 
their conclusion is that only the business economists behave more selfishly than others, 
and that this behavior is the result of selection rather than indoctrination.     
  The major structural difference between Frey and Meier’s UZ study and our study at 
the University of Washington (UW) is that the UZ data set shows students taking a 
prescribed series of classes at prescribed points during their programs: economics 
students take the economics sequence, law students take the law sequence, etc., without 
much flexibility. In contrast, the UW data set displays greater variability, with students 
from different majors taking economics classes at different points during their studies. 
Because our data set contains both year of study (freshman, sophomore, etc.) as well as the 
quarter and academic year each student was enrolled in each class, we can distinguish the   6 
effects of economics training from the effects of general year-to-year progress. This allows 
for a crisp test of the selection and indoctrination hypotheses using observed data. 
 
III. Data 
  Our data set, obtained from the UW registrar, covers the 8,743 undergraduate Arts 
and Sciences students aged 17-23 who registered between summer quarter 1999 (what we 
will call Q1) and spring quarter 2002 (Q12) and who had a declared major at the end of this 
sample window. This yields a panel data set of 65,044 observations. In addition to each 
student’s declared major, the administrative data set includes the quarter (if any) in which 
each student took introductory or intermediate microeconomics at UW.2  
  Sample statistics are reported in Table 1. Some 8% of the students were economics 
majors, a grouping in which we include double-majors; we use the label “other A&S majors” 
to refer to the 92% who declared an Arts and Sciences major other than economics. Of the 
total sample, 32% took introductory microeconomics—and 7% took intermediate 
microeconomics—at some point before the end of the study period. Approximately 61% of 
the students were women, 2% were black, 21% were Asian, and 2% were international 
students.  
  Our data set includes quarterly records on voluntary contributions by each student 
to “qualifying groups” that are recognized by the university. Two such groups existed 
                                                        
2 We can tell if a student took one of these classes at UW prior to our study period, but we 
cannot tell if a student took one of these classes prior to attending UW. We address this 
limitation with a robustness test described in Section V.   7 
during our study period: the Washington Public Interest Research Group (WashPIRG) and 
Affordable Tuition Now (ATN).  
  WashPIRG is a left-leaning activist group whose mission is “to deliver persistent, 
result-oriented public interest activism that protects consumers, encourage a fair, 
sustainable economy, and foster responsive, democratic government” ( WashPIRG 2009). 
WashPIRG has been a qualifying group at UW since 1976.   
  ATN is a group that lobbied for “sensible tuition rates, quality financial aid, and 
adequate funding of colleges at both the state and federal level(s)” (ATN 2005). ATN 
became a qualifying group following a petition drive and student body election in spring 
quarter 2000, so the registration period before summer quarter 2000 (Q5) was the first 
one in which students were solicited for a donation to ATN. During our sample period, 27% 
of students donated at least once to WashPIRG and 34% donated at least once to ATN. 
  The solicitation process for qualifying groups occurs when students register for 
classes prior to the coming quarter.3 During the registration process, each student is asked 
if he or she wants to add (for example) an additional $3 to their tuition bill to support 
WashPIRG. There is some evidence that students understand their choices and behave in 
accordance with economic principles: UW historical data indicate that when the requested 
donation for WashPIRG increased from $2 in winter 1994 to $3 in spring 1994 the 
                                                        
3 From the start of our study period through winter quarter 2000 (Q3), the registration 
process took place via an automated telephone system called STAR. This system was 
replaced by online registration in October 2002 (Q14), but from spring quarter 2000 (Q4) 
through the remainder of our study period (Q12) students could register either via 
telephone or online (Rosen 2002).    8 
percentage of students who donated fell from 11.6% to 10.1%, suggesting a price elasticity 
of demand of about -0.34.4  
  Figures 1 and 2 show the donation rates for WashPIRG and ATN during our study 
period. The low donation rates during summer quarters (Q1, Q5, and Q9) and during the 
first two quarters of ATN’s existence are noteworthy, but what really stands out in all 
quarters is that University of Washington (UW) donation rates pale in comparison to the 
University of Zurich (UZ) donation rates in Frey and Meier (2003). An average of 61% of UZ 
students contribute to both funds each semester, while at UW the giving percentage each 
quarter averages 14% for ATN and 10% for WashPIRG. This result could be because of 
differences in how the requests are made (Frey and Meier [2004] note that “the manner in 
which one is asked to donate is crucial”) or differences in for what the requests are made 
(perhaps students are keen to give to scholarship funds and less keen to support political 
activities) or differences in from whom the requests are made (perhaps there are 
differences between Swiss and American students), but differences in “university culture” 
are definitely not responsible: the same large differences show up when looking at 
decisions made by incoming first-year students.5 
 
                                                        
4 In addition to the 1999-2002 panel data that is the focus of our paper, we also have 
aggregate data on student donations from 1992-2001 (Holm 2002). During our study 
period the contribution request each quarter was $3 for WashPIRG and $2 for ATN. 
5 Looking only at students during their freshman year at UW, we find that 10% of students 
who eventually become economics majors donate to ATN and 5% of these students donate 
to WashPIRG; the comparable percentages for students who eventually choose another 
Arts and Sciences major are 18% for ATN and 12% for WashPIRG. The differences between 
majors and non-majors are significantly different for both funds.   9 
IV. Descriptive Analysis 
  Figures 3 and 4 show the percentage of economics majors and other A&S majors 
who donated to WashPIRG and ATN during quarters in which they had no prior exposure 
to microeconomics at UW (group 1), during quarters in which they had prior exposure to 
introductory microeconomics but not intermediate microeconomics (group 2), and during 
quarters in which they had prior exposure to both introductory and intermediate 
microeconomics (group 3). These figures suggest that economics majors are less generous 
than other Arts and Sciences majors. About 5% of economics majors donate to WashPIRG 
in a given quarter, compared with 8% for other majors. A similar divide—10% versus over 
14%—occurs with respect to donations to ATN.  
  Figures 3 and 4 also show that exposure to microeconomics appears to have a 
significant effect on generosity for other Arts and Sciences majors but little effect on 
generosity for economics majors. For the former group, the likelihood of donating to 
WashPIRG falls from about 12% prior to studying introductory microeconomics to about 
9% afterwards. There is also a marked decline in these students’ propensity to donate to 
ATN at each juncture: nearly 17% donated prior to taking any economics, only 13% 
donated after taking introductory microeconomics, and less than 9% donated after taking 
intermediate microeconomics. Relative to other A&S students, economics majors are much 
less likely to give prior to studying economics, but their donation rates appear to be 
unaffected by exposure to economics courses. 
 
   10 
V. Empirical Model 
  To test whether economics majors are inherently less generous than other Arts and 
Sciences majors and whether studying economics discourages students from being 
generous we estimate the following model: 
  Pr(DonateiQ) = α + β Econi + γIntro IntroiQ + γInter Intermediate iQ + X iQ θ + ξiQ   (1) 
 
In this model “i” refers to student and “Q” indicates quarter (Q1 through Q12). A student 
who donates in (say) Q2 is a student who donates at the end of Q2, i.e., during registration 
for Q3. Econ indicates that the student is an economics major; the default category is other 
majors in Arts and Sciences. Intro and Intermediate are dummy variables indicating that the 
student had registered in introductory or intermediate microeconomics by the end of the 
prior quarter. The set of controls, X, includes dummy variables for sex, race, year of birth, 
quarter, year in the program, and whether the student is an international student.  
  Column (1) of Table 2 reports estimates of equation (1) where the dependent 
variable is the likelihood of donating to WashPIRG and Intro and Intermediate are excluded. 
Field of study matters: economics majors are about 5.6 percentage points less likely to 
donate than other Arts and Sciences majors.  
  Are economics majors inherently less generous, or are the differences due to their 
training? We answer this question in terms of the random effects model in columns (2). 
According to the random effects model, students are about 2.1 percentage points less likely 
to donate to WashPIRG after having taken introductory microeconomics; there is no   11 
evidence that intermediate microeconomics affects the likelihood of donating. The 
estimated effect of Econ remains significant even after controlling for students’ exposure to 
economics. The effects of economics training, when estimated under fixed effects (column 
3), are similar to the random effects estimates: students are about 1.7 percentage points 
less likely to donate after taking introductory microeconomics, and there is no evidence 
that taking intermediate microeconomics affects the propensity to donate.  
  We repeat the prior analysis with respect to ATN and report the results in columns 
(4) through (6). For the most part, the ATN results are qualitatively similar to those for 
WashPIRG. Depending on specification, we find that economics majors are between 3.6 and 
6.4 percentage points less likely to donate than other A&S majors. Estimates of the effect of 
Intro range from 1.6 to 2.9 percentage points. One difference between the WashPIRG and 
ATN results is that students are about 2.3 percentage points less likely to contribute to ATN 
after having taken intermediate microeconomics. 
  The negative coefficient on “Female” for both WashPIRG and ATN indicates that 
women are less generous than men: women are about 2 percentage points less likely than 
men to contribute to WashPIRG and 3.7 percentage points less likely to contribute to ATN. 
Given the ambiguous findings in the literature on gender and generosity in classroom 
experiments (e.g., Andreoni and Vesterlund 2001, Eckel and Grossman 1998, 2008), it is 
noteworthy that our results echo those of Frey and Meier (2003).   
  White students and students from later-born cohorts are more likely to donate than 
others. International students, who have less stake in the social programs, are less likely to 
donate. We would expect, particularly with respect to ATN, that each individual students   12 
would donate less over time because of the narrowing window of opportunity for that 
student to realize the benefits from their donations. However, there is little evidence that 
this is the case; indeed, freshmen are less likely to donate to WashPIRG than students in 
other years.  
 Differences by Program 
  The results reported in Table 2 indicate that economics majors are markedly less 
likely to donate than other A&S majors. This suggests that there might be other respects in 
which donation behavior differs between the groups. We therefore disaggregate with 
respect to major; the results, reported in Table 3, confirm the impression from Figures 3 
and 4 that other A&S majors become less generous as they are exposed to economics.  
  It appears that only non-majors are impacted by studying economics. Fixed effects 
estimates indicate that taking introductory microeconomics reduces their likelihood of 
donating to WashPIRG by 2.0 percentage points. Taking intermediate microeconomics 
reduces their likelihood of donating to WashPIRG by 3.7 percentage points and to ATN by 
7.9 percentage points. The effect of Intro on donation to ATN is significantly negative but no 
significant effect is detected in the fixed effects specification. Other coefficients reinforce 
the findings from the pooled analysis in Table 2: men, domestic students, whites, and later-
born cohorts are more likely to donate than their complements. 
  The Table 3 results suggest that economics majors respond differently to economics 
classes than do other Arts and Sciences majors. But are these differences significant? We 
answer this question in terms of the interacted specification:    13 
   Pr(DonateiQ) = α + β Econi + γIntro IntroiQ + γInter IntermediateiQ +  
     + δEcon_Intro Econi*IntroiQ + δEcon_Inter Econi*IntermediateiQ + X iQ θ + ξiQ         (2) 
 
where the effects of taking each of the two economics courses are allowed to differ by 
major. The results are reported in Table 4.  
  The responses of majors and non-majors to training are significantly different, with 
the latter group showing a greater responsiveness to exposure to economics courses. 
According to the random effects specification, the negative effect of taking introductory 
microeconomics on donations to WashPIRG is 1.4 percent lower, in absolute value, for 
majors relative to non-majors. The fixed effects estimates indicate that the effect of taking 
intermediate microeconomics is 3.6 percent lower in absolute value.   
  Economics training has a similar smaller effect on donations to ATN for majors 
relative to non-majors. Estimates of the magnitudes of the differences in the effects of 
intermediate microeconomics range from 5.9 to 6.6 percentage points, depending on 
specification. The fixed effects results indicate that the response to introductory 
microeconomics is 3.2 percent lower for majors.  
  As mentioned in Section III, our data set reports the date of enrollment in 
introductory and intermediate microeconomics at UW, but it does not report possible 
exposure at other institutions. We can infer that a student who enrolled in intermediate 
microeconomics at UW without taking introductory microeconomics at UW must have 
taken that prerequisite prior to attending UW, but we cannot tell if a student who did not 
take either class at UW took either class prior to UW. So as a robustness test we restrict our   14 
sample to students classified as freshmen at UW for at least three quarters; these students 
were unlikely to have taken college courses elsewhere.  
The results of this robustness test are reported in Table 5. The overall impression is 
similar to that from the full-sample results, but there are some differences. For non-majors, 
the effect of taking intermediate microeconomics on WashPIRG donations is much more 
pronounced for the restricted sample (a decline of about 13 percentage points) than for the 
full sample (a decline of about 4 percentage points). Once again, the overall effect of taking 
intermediate is completely counteracted by a coefficient of about 13 percent on the 
interaction term Econ_Inter. That is, there is no significant effect of taking intermediate 
economics on majors’ donations.   
The ATN results for the restricted sample are not significant, perhaps because the 
restricted sample is only one-third the size of the full sample.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Other research—notably Allgood et al. (2004), who report that “former students, 
especially those who did not major in economics, are not particularly impressed with how 
important much of the content in our courses is, or with how the courses are taught”—
supports the conclusion that undergraduate economics courses are bad. Our results lend 
weight to a different concern, namely that undergraduate economics courses are a public 
bad. Our real-world data set reveals that students who are not economics majors are less   15 
likely to contribute to social programs after studying economics than they were 
beforehand. This effect appears only for non-majors, not for majors.  
  One interpretation of these results is that students who are not economics majors 
suffer a “loss of innocence” during economics classes because of exposure to certain ideas 
(the prisoners’ dilemma or the invisible hand) or because of exposure to certain people 
(namely, economics majors). In contrast, students who become economics majors do not 
suffer a loss of innocence. This may be because they lost their innocence in high school—
Frey and Meier (2003) find that pre-university exposure to economics reduces giving—or 
perhaps even because economics majors were “born guilty”. 
  A heavy-handed reading of our findings might suggest that non-majors should be 
prohibited from studying economics, but because economics classes offer benefits as well 
as costs we come to a different conclusion, namely that introductory courses should do 
more to cover topics such as altruism and reciprocal behavior. Profit-maximization is a fine 
assumption for businesses, but a narrowly defined “selfish” version of utility maximization 
is neither accurate nor appropriate for modeling individual behavior.  
  As a final note it is worth pointing out that training students in this “selfish” version 
of utility maximization may be a private bad as well as a public bad. Recent research 
demonstrates that more generous individuals fare better in terms of a variety of outcomes. 
Dohman et al. (2009) find that those reporting greater propensity for positive reciprocal 
behavior do better in the labor market, e.g., they earn more and they are less likely to be 
unemployed. Konow and Early (2009) use a dictator game to show that selfish behavior is 
associated with lower psychological well-being, lower material well-being and less overall   16 
happiness than selfless behavior. These studies present some support for what is called the 
hedonistic paradox: behaving as homo economicus does not appear to be individually 
optimal. The paradox may of course be explained by unobservable differences in 
personality characteristics. But to the extent that these characteristics are the result of 
nurture rather than nature, training students in ways that make them more self-interested 
makes them worse off.      17 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
  WashPIRG    ATN 
  Mean  Std. Dev.    Mean  Std.Dev. 
Time-Invariant   
Ever Donated  0.266  0.442    0.340  0.474 
Economics Major  0.085  0.279    0.085  0.279 
A&S Non-Major  0.915  0.279    0.915  0.279 
Ever Had Intro  0.316  0.465    0.316  0.465 
Ever Had Intermediate  0.073  0.260    0.073  0.260 
Female  0.609  0.488    0.609  0.488 
Year Born  1980.2  1.143    1980.2  1.143 
Black  0.020  0.139    0.020  0.139 
Asian  0.208  0.406    0.208  0.406 
International  0.018  0.134    0.018  0.134 
Time Varying   
Donated this Quarter  0.111  0.314    0.153  0.360 
Has Had Intro (Intro)  0.257  0.437    0.279  0.449 
Has Had Intermediate 
(Intermediate)  0.038  0.191    0.046  0.208 
Freshman  0.168  0.374    0.236  0.424 
Sophomore  0.271  0.444    0.106  0.308 
Junior  0.325  0.468    0.349  0.477 
Senior  0.237  0.425    0.309  0.462 
           




Likelihood of Donating 
Pooled Data 
     
  WashPIRG  ATN 
             
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
             
  RE  RE  FE  RE  RE  FE 
             
Econ  -0.0556  -0.0443    -0.0642  -0.0358   
  (7.35)**  (5.42)**    (7.77)**  (3.71)**   
             
Intro    -0.0209  -0.0173    -0.0287  -0.016 
    (5.58)**  (3.30)**    (5.36)**  (1.90) 
             
Intermediate    0.0003  -0.0009    -0.0227  -0.024 
    (0.06)  (0.12)    (2.64)**  (2.04)* 
             
Female  -0.0235  -0.025    -0.0363  -0.0388   
  (4.31)**  (4.58)**    (6.25)**  (6.66)**   
             
Yrborn  0.0167  0.0158    0.0203  0.019   
  (5.89)**  (5.57)**    (6.33)**  (5.93)**   
             
Black  -0.0675  -0.0676    -0.0524  -0.0531   
  (4.79)**  (4.80)**    (2.85)**  (2.88)**   
             
Asian  -0.0706  -0.0689    -0.0809  -0.0786   
  (13.19)**  (12.88)**    (13.62)**  (13.21)**   
             
International  -0.0865  -0.0862    -0.1075  -0.1078   
  (7.11)**  (7.10)**    (7.35)**  (7.39)**   
             
N Obs.  65044  65044  65044  46812  46812  46812 
N Students  8743  8743  8743  8557  8557  8557 
 
                                                        
 Linear probability models with z-scores in parentheses. Models also include dummy 
variables indicating quarter, sophomore, junior and senior. RE: Random Effects, FE: Fixed 
Effects. *Significant at 5 percent level, **Significant at 1 percent level. Bold type: significant 
at 10 percent level.   23 
 
                                                        
1 Linear probability models with z-scores in parentheses. Models also include dummy 
variables indicating quarter, sophomore, junior and senior. RE: Random Effects, FE: Fixed 
Effects. *Significant at 5 percent level, **Significant at 1 percent level. Bold type: significant 
at 10 percent level. 
Table 31 
Likelihood of Donating 
By Major 
                 
  WashPIRG  ATN 
                 
  Economics  Arts & Sciences  Economics  Arts & Sciences 
                 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
                 
  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE  RE  FE 
                 
Intro  -0.0  -0.00  -0.0234  -0.020  -0.0144  -0.0055  -0.0274  -0.0114 
  (0.4)  (0.21)  (5.6)**  (3.4)**  (1.01)  (0.32)  (4.7)**  -1.13 
                 
Intermedia
te 
-0.0  0.001  -0.0324  -0.037  0.0026  0.015  -0.073  -0.079 
  (0.2)  (0.09)  (1.70)  (2.03)*  (0.20)  (0.94)  (3.2)**  (3.5)** 
                 
Female  -0.02    -0.0255    -0.0207    -0.0407   
  (2.0)*    (4.4)**    (1.36)    (6.6)**   
                 
Yrborn  -0.0    0.017    0.005    0.0204   
  (0.1)    (5.7)**    (0.52)    (6.0)**   
                 
Black  0.12    -0.0731    -0.0017    -0.0544   
  (1.8)    (5.1)**    (0.02)    (2.9)**   
                 
Asian  -0.06    -0.07    -0.0719    -0.079   
  (4.5)**    (12)**    (4.8)**    (12)**   
                 
Internat  -0.043    -0.105    -0.0635    -0.1299   
  (2.1)*    (7.2)**    (2.44)*    (7.4)**   
                 
N Obs.  5903  5903  59141  59141  4180  4180  42632  42632 
N Students  741  741  8002  8002  735  735  7822  7822 





Likelihood of Donating 
Interacted Specifications 
Full Sample 
         
  WashPIRG  ATN 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  RE  FE  RE  FE 
         
Econ  -0.0537    -0.029   
  (5.56)**    (2.15)*   
         
Intro  -0.0233  -0.0163  -0.0266  -0.0072 
  (5.62)**  (2.74)**  (4.60)**  (0.72) 
         
Intermediate  -0.0323  -0.0384  -0.0723  -0.0766 
  (1.7)  (2.15)*  (3.20)**  (3.45)** 
         
E_Intro  0.0143  0.0119  -0.0148  -0.0316 
  (1.72)  (1.08)  (1.03)  (1.77)s 
         
E_Intermediate  0.0319  0.0364  0.0589  0.0656 
  (1.60)  (1.89)  (2.41)*  (2.58)** 
         
Observations  65044  65044  46812  46812 
Number of id  8743  8743  8557  8557 
         
 
                                                        
 Linear probability models with z-scores in parentheses. Models also include year born and 
dummy variables indicating quarter, sophomore, junior and senior female, black, and 
international. RE: Random Effects, FE: Fixed Effects. *Significant at 5 percent level, 




Likelihood of Donating 
Interacted Specifications 
Freshman at Least 3 Quarters 
         
  WashPIRG  ATN 
         
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
  RE  FE  RE  FE 
         
Econ  -0.0515    -0.0194   
  (3.38)**    (0.92)   
         
Intro  -0.0283  -0.0276  -0.0215  -0.0117 
  (4.10)**  (3.13)**  (2.13)*  -0.83 
         
Intermediate  -0.1299  -0.1379  -0.0657  -0.0357 
  (2.85)**  (3.32)**  (1.26)  (0.79) 
         
E_Intro  0.0089  0.0083  -0.0268  -0.0345 
  (0.75)  (0.55)  (1.28)  (1.43) 
         
E_Intermediate  0.125  0.1316  0.0476  0.0275 
  (2.66)**  (3.02)**  -0.87  -0.55 
         
Observations  20028  20028  15426  15426 
Number of id  2600  2600  2592  2592 
 
 
                                                        
 Linear probability models with z-scores in parentheses. Models also include year born and 
dummy variables indicating quarter, sophomore, junior and senior female, black, and 
international. RE: Random Effects, FE: Fixed Effects. *Significant at 5 percent level, 
**Significant at 1 percent level. Bold type: significant at 10 percent level. 